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A CONCEPTUAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE GREEN 
ECONOMY 
 
Elisa Morgera and Annalisa Savaresi 
 
The 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development had as one of its 
two main themes ‘a green economy in the context of sustainable development and 
poverty eradication’. The conference did not agree upon a definition of green 
economy and limited itself to ‘encourage each country to consider the implementation 
of green economy policies’ as one of the different approaches available to achieve 
sustainable development. Nevertheless, its outcome document provides a host of 
indications about the challenges and opportunities to achieve sustainable 
development through the green economy. This article offers a conceptual and legal 
perspective on the green economy, by investigating the evolution of the related policy 
debate and focusing on whether the text on the green economy adopted at Rio+20 
provides new insights on the implementation of sustainable development, notably in 
relation to environmental integration, intra-generational equity, human rights and 
corporate accountability. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD, or ‘Rio+20’) 
had as one of its two main themes ‘a green economy in the context of sustainable 
development and poverty eradication’.1 The conference did not agree upon a 
consensus definition of green economy and limited itself to ‘encourage each country 
to consider the implementation of green economy policies’ as one of the different 
approaches available to achieve sustainable development.2 Nevertheless, the Rio+20 
outcome document provides several indications of the challenges to, and opportunities 
for, achieving sustainable development through the green economy. Against this 
background, this article offers a conceptual and legal perspective on the green 
economy as a means of implementation for sustainable development, by investigating 
the evolution of the related policy debate, starting from the shift in discourse from 
green growth to green economy. It then assesses whether the text on the green 
economy included in the outcome document provides new insights on the 
implementation of sustainable development, notably in relation to key principles of 
international environmental law, such as environmental integration and intra-
generational equity, and challenging questions for the development and 
implementation of international environmental law, such as the link with human 
rights and corporate accountability. 
 
ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE DISCOURSE 
 
The notion of ‘green economy’ is rooted in environmental economics. The term 
appears in a 1989 report by Pearce et al., which elaborated the cornerstones of 
                                                 
1 Implementation of Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the 
outcomes of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (UNGA Resolution A/RES/64/236, 24 
December 2009), at paragraph 20(a). 
2 The Future We Want (UN Doc. A/RES/66/288, 11 September 2012), Annex, at paragraphs 56 and 62. 
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environmental valuation, based upon the premise that placing proper values on the 
services provided by the natural environment is necessary to ensure its sustainable use 
and conservation.3 These ideas have increasingly underpinned environmental 
regulatory experiments, most notably schemes for the payments of ecosystem 
services.4 Economic valuation has gradually become prominent in multilateral 
environmental negotiations. It was given wide resonance by the Stern Review on the 
Economics of Climate Change.5 More recently, the report on the Economics of 
Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB)6 has palpably influenced intergovernmental 
guidance to enhance implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity.7 
Along similar lines, in the run-up to the Rio+20 conference, the EU, Germany and the 
Secretariat of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification8 launched the 
‘Economics of Land Degradation’ initiative,9 in an effort to provide new impetus to 
international cooperation on desertification through determining the costs of global 
land degradation and inaction to counter this.10 
 
In addition to its emphasis on environmental valuation, the green economy has been 
promoted recently by key international institutions to address the global financial, 
food and climate crises in an interconnected manner, by placing environmental 
protection centre stage.11 In this context, the term green economy has been used to 
refer to resource-efficient and low-carbon economic development that contributes to 
the protection and enhancement of the natural resource base and promotes sustainable 
consumption and production patterns.12 This rapidly evolving discourse has 
                                                 
3 D. Pearce, A. Markandya and E.B. Barbier, Blueprint for a Green Economy (Earthscan, 1989), at 5. 
4 There are several definitions of the term ‘payment for ecosystem services’ in the literature. They may 
be defined as voluntary transactions where a well-defined ecosystem service (or type of land use likely 
to secure that service) is bought by at least one ecosystem service buyer from at least one ecosystem 
service provider, if and only if the provider secures ecosystem service provision (conditionality). S. 
Wunder, Payments for Environmental Services: Some Nuts and Bolts (Center for International Forestry 
Research, 2005). 
5 N. Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
The United Kingdom submitted a summary of the findings of the review. See UNFCCC Dialogue on 
Long-term Cooperative Action to Address Climate Change by Enhancing Implementation of the 
Convention Second Workshop Nairobi, 15-16 November 2006, Dialogue Working Paper 20/Add.1 
(2006), found at: <http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/dialogue/application/pdf/wp_20_add.1_e.pdf>. 
6 TEEB, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity for National and International Policy Makers 
– Summary: Responding to the Value of Nature (United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 
2009). 
7 Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992; in force 29 December 1993) 
(‘CBD’). See Decision X/4, Third Edition of the Global Biodiversity Outlook: Implications for the 
Future Implementation of the Convention (UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27, 20 January 2011); and 
discussion in: E. Morgera and E. Tsioumani, ‘Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Looking Afresh at the 
Convention on Biological Diversity’ 21 Yearbook of International Environmental Law (2011), 3, at 12-
13. 
8 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought 
and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, (Paris, 14 October 1994; in force 26 December 1996). 
9 <http://eld-initiative.org/>. 
10 European Commission Communication of 20 June 2011, Rio+20: Towards the Green Economy and 
Better Governance, COM (2011)363, at 3 and 12. 
11 A. Steiner, ‘Focusing on the Good or the Bad: What Can International Environmental Law Do To 
Accelerate the Transition Towards a Green Economy?’, 103 American Society of International Law 
Proceedings (2009), 3, at 4-5. 
12 The Future We Want – Zero Draft of the Outcome Document of the UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development, 10 January 2012, (‘Zero Draft’), found at: 
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emphasized opportunities for business development, job creation and public-sector 
savings arising from incorporating environmental industries, technologies and 
infrastructure in stimulus packages and investment promotion, as well as from the 
promotion of biodiversity-based businesses.13 As we show below, although the debate 
on the green economy predates the UN General Assembly decision to organize the 
Rio+20 conference, the negotiations in preparation for the conference faced the 
challenge of further clarifying this notion and its role as a means of implementation 
for sustainable development.14 The need for conceptual clarity was partly due to the 
fact that at the policy level, attention had initially focused on green ‘growth’,15 rather 
than the green economy. This section traces the origin of this debate, starting from the 
discourse on green growth. 
 
GREEN GROWTH: THE VISION OF A RESTRICTED GROUP OF 
COUNTRIES? 
 
The concept of green growth has been deployed in economics literature to identify the 
conditions of compatibility between economic growth and environmental 
sustainability.16 The underlying notion is that sustainable growth is indeed possible, 
as opposed to theories of limits to growth.17 The policy discourse on green growth to 
a great extent seems to reflect the views of advanced economies and developed 
countries.18 
 
The first intergovernmental endorsement of green growth came with the Fifth 
Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development in Asia and the Pacific, 
held in 2005.19 The conference launched the Seoul Initiative on Environmentally 
Sustainable Economic Growth (Green Growth).20 In this context, green growth was 
presented as ‘a policy focus for the Asia and Pacific region, emphasizing 
                                                                                                                                           
<http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/content/documents/370The%20Future%20We%20Want%2010Jan
%20clean%20_no%20brackets.pdf>, at paragraph 20. It should be noted that Rio+20 endorsed the 10-
year Framework of Programmes on sustainable production and consumption, which is not discussed in 
this contribution. See The Future We Want, n. 2 above, at paragraph 226. 
13 See A. Steiner, n. 11 above, at 4. 
14 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), A Guidebook to the Green 
Economy (UNDESA, 2012), at 5. 
15 For an overview, see e.g. L.Ø. Blaxekjær, The Emergence and Spreading of the Green Growth 
Policy Concept, Paper prepared for Earth System Governance Conference 2012, Lund University, 18-
20 April 2012. 
16  See for example P. Ekins, Economic Growth Human Welfare and Environmental Sustainability: The 
Prospects for Green Growth (Routledge, 2000), at 78. 
17 D.H. Meadows et al., Limits to Growth (Universe Books, 1972), and D.H. Meadows, J. Randers and 
D.L. Meadows, Limits to Growth. The 30 Years Update (Chelsea Green, 2004). 
18 See however the National Green Growth Roadmap adopted by Cambodia and Rwanda. Kingdom of 
Cambodia, The National Green Growth Road Map. (2009), found at: 
<http://www.greengrowth.org/?q=publication/national-green-growth-roadmap-cambobia>; Republic of 
Rwanda, Green Growth and Climate Resilience. (2011), found at: <http://cdkn.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/12/Rwanda-Green-Growth-Strategy-FINAL1.pdf>. References to green growth 
were furthermore included in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, adopted in 2010, found at: 
<http://www.apcoworldwide.com/content/pdfs/chinas_12th_five-year_plan.pdf>. 
19 <http://www.unescap.org/mced/>; see also UNDESA, n. 14 above, at 33. 
20  United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), Seoul Initiative on 
Environmentally Sustainable Economic Growth (Green Growth) (UN Doc. 
E/ESCAP/SO/MCED(05)/6, 21 March 2005). 
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environmentally sustainable economic progress to foster low-carbon, socially 
inclusive development.’21 The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) subsequently adopted a work programme on green 
growth, linking regional implementation of international environmental conventions 
with capacity building.22 In a 2012 report,23 UNESCAP presented green growth as a 
leapfrogging opportunity for developing countries that needs to be driven by 
government.24 Five main tracks for a transition to low-carbon green growth were 
identified, namely: 1) improving the quality of growth and maximizing net growth; 2) 
closing the gap between economic and ecological efficiencies; 3) planning and 
designing eco-efficient infrastructure; 4) turning environmental protection into a 
business opportunity; and 5) formulating and implementing low-carbon development 
strategies.25 UNESCAP’s roadmap singled out the importance of legal and 
institutional frameworks to create the enabling conditions for green growth,26 making 
specific reference to the adoption of carbon pricing, cap and trade schemes, eco-
labelling and extended producer responsibility.27 
 
The Republic of Korea has played a prominent role in promoting the green growth 
agenda in Asia and beyond.28 The country joined the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) in 1996 and adopted specific policies to foster 
green growth already in 2008.29 Although it does not have any binding emission 
reduction or limitation commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, the Republic of Korea 
is the world’s ninth largest greenhouse gas emitter.30 Against this background, the 
country adopted an economic stimulus package focusing on energy-efficient 
buildings, renewable energy, low-carbon vehicles and development of the rail 
network, as well as more efficient use of freshwater and waste.31 
 
In 2009, the package was complemented by a National Strategy for Low Carbon 
Green Growth. The strategy revolves around three core objectives: mitigating climate 
change and strengthening the country’s energy independence; creating new growth 
‘engines’ (i.e. technologies); and improving the quality of people’s lives and 
enhancing Korea’s international standing. The strategy requires the government to 
invest 2 percent of GDP in green growth for the first five years. It was supported by 
                                                 
21 <http://www.greengrowth.org/?q=static-page/sat-10012011-1104/about-green-growth>. 
22 <http://www.unescap.org/esd/environment/greengrowth/>. 
23 UNESCAP, Low Carbon Green Growth Roadmap for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP, 2012). 
24 Ibid. at xix. 
25 Ibid., at xxii. 
26 Ibid., at 49. 
27 Ibid., at 54. 
28 The efforts of the Republic of Korea have had wide international resonance, and the country played a 
key role in facilitating the adoption of the OECD Declaration on Green Growth (see below) See 
UNDESA, n. 14 above, at 33-34. The Republic of Korea was also instrumental in the establishment of 
the Global Green Growth Institute in 2010, which was endorsed as a new international organization by 
Australia, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ethiopia, Guyana, Kiribati, Norway, Papua New Guinea, 
Paraguay, the Philippines, Qatar, the UAE, the UK, and Vietnam on the sidelines of the Rio+20 
Conference. See <http://www.gggi.org/news/release/2011/00/00/gggi-holds-signing-ceremony-
convert-international-organization-rio20-0>. 
29 <http://www.greengrowth.go.kr/?page_id=42454>. 
30 <http://www.greengrowth.go.kr/?page_id=42461>. 
31 UNEP, Overview of the Republic of Korea’s National Strategy for Green Growth (UNEP, 2010), at 
43. 
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the creation of a Presidential Committee on Green Growth to streamline governmental 
action on green growth. 
 
In 2010 a Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth was adopted, further 
detailing steps to promote the development of the national economy through low-
carbon green growth.32 The Framework Act establishes a system of mandatory 
reporting of carbon emissions by all carbon and energy-intensive industries and 
entrusts the government with the adoption of a broad spectrum of measures, including 
support for green industry,33 facilitating research development and commercialization 
of green technologies,34 and the realization of a low-carbon society35 by setting 
targets for greenhouse gas emission reductions, energy efficiency and renewable 
energy.36 The Framework Act also includes provisions concerning life-style changes 
and the adoption of public awareness-raising measures.37 
 
On this basis, the government adopted a 30 percent greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction target by 2020 and recently passed cap-and-trade legislation.38 The 
Republic of Korea has also adopted plans to enhance energy efficiency by 2020, 
including measures specifically targeting high emission industries, more stringent fuel 
efficiency standards for automobiles, and a ban on incandescent light bulbs.39 
Announced further measures include targets to increase the share of renewable in the 
energy mix, which is set to reach 11 percent in 2030.40 
 
The Korean government has furthermore adopted a series of measures to incentivize 
the production of hybrid and hydrogen fuel cell cars,41 and energy efficiency targets 
for the building sector.42 Even with the planned improvements, however, the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has estimated that the country is projected 
to remain below the OECD average for energy efficiency.43 Implementation of the 
strategy has also lead to the adoption of measures aimed to improve the country’s 
water infrastructure, through a large-scale operation of river restoration (the Four 
Rivers Restoration Project).44 
 
Green growth policies adopted by the Republic of Korea thus appear to be largely 
focused on low-carbon growth, with a special emphasis on climate change and energy 
efficiency, and the embedding of related targets in legislation. This focus is reflected 
in parallel policy developments in the European Union (EU). 
                                                 
32 Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth, Act 9931 (13 January 2010), Article 1. 
33 Ibid., Article 23. 
34 Ibid., Article 26. 
35 Ibid., Chapter V. 
36 Ibid., Article 42. 
37 Ibid., Chapter VI. 
38 <http://www.greengrowth.go.kr/?page_id=42461>. 
39 See UNEP, n. 31 above, at 25. 
40 Ibid., at 10. 
41 See <http://www.greengrowth.go.kr/?page_id=42472>. 
42 See UNEP, n. 31 above, at 11. 
43 Ibid., at 9.  
44 J. Card, ‘Korea’s Four Rivers Project: Economic Boost or Boondoggle?’, Yale Environment 360 (21 
September 2009), found at: 
<http://e360.yale.edu/feature/koreas_four_rivers_project_economic_boost_or_boondoggle/2188/>. 
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Green growth is the second pillar of the EU’s Europe 2020 Strategy: a strategy for 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, adopted in 2010.45 The green growth pillar 
(‘promoting a more resource-efficient, greener and more competitive economy’) 
mainly reiterates the EU’s pre-existing ‘20-20-20’ climate change target of cutting 
greenhouse gas emissions within the EU by 20% from 1990 levels by the year 2020, 
while also increasing the share of renewable energy to 20% and improving energy 
efficiency by 20%.46 
 
The predominance of climate concerns emerged also in relation to the concept of 
‘resource-efficient’ Europe, which was initially defined as decoupling growth from 
the use of resources, but shifted towards a low-carbon economy, increasing the use of 
renewables, modernizing the transport sector and promoting energy efficiency.47 Only 
quick references to preventing environmental degradation, biodiversity loss and 
unsustainable use of natural resources have been included in the flagship initiative on 
a ‘resource-efficient Europe’.48 Here the concept of resource efficiency encompasses 
energy efficiency, reforms of fisheries and agricultural policies, biodiversity and 
ecosystem services conservation, building a ‘circular economy’ based on recycling 
and waste generation reduction, climate change adaptation and water efficiency.49 
 
Europe 2020 also led to the flagship initiative on ‘an industrial policy for the 
globalization era,’ which emphasizes competitiveness and the promotion of green 
technologies. There, however, attention is also drawn to the need to monitor 
‘sustainable competitiveness’, review sustainable consumption and production 
policies, and address emerging issues in corporate social responsibility, such as 
business and human rights, and company disclosure of environmental, social, 
employment-related, and governance information.50 The document links 
competitiveness with the idea of a ‘bioeconomy’, based on the production of 
renewable biological resources and their conversion into value-added products, such 
as food, feed, bioenergy as well as other agricultural, fisheries, forestry products.51 To 
achieve a bioeconomy, the EU points to the need to improve the knowledge base and 
foster innovation to achieve productivity while ensuring sustainable resource use and 
environmental stress avoidance, climate change adaptation, participatory governance 
                                                 
45 European Commission Communication of 3 March 2010, ‘Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth’, COM (10)2020. The commitment to green growth is complemented 
by the ‘smart growth’ pillar on developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation; and the 
‘inclusive growth’ pillar, which concerns fostering high-employment economy in delivering social and 
territorial cohesion. 
46 European Commission Communication of 23 January 2008, ‘20 20 by 2020. Europe’s Climate 
Change Opportunity’, COM(08)30. For a commentary of the legal implications of the strategy, see K. 
Kulovesi, E. Morgera and M. Muñoz, ‘Environmental Integration and the Multi-faceted International 
Dimensions of EU Law: Unpacking the EU's 2009 Climate and Energy Package’, 48:3 Common 
Market Law Review (2011), 829. 
47 European Commission Communication of 26 January 2011, ‘A resource-efficient Europe – Flagship 
initiative under the Europe 2020 Strategy’ COM(11)21, at 5. 
48 Ibid., at 14 and 20. 
49 Ibid., at 6. 
50 European Commission Communication of 25 October 2011, ‘A Renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for 
Corporate Social Responsibility’ COM(11)681. 
51 European Commission Communication of 13 February 2012, ‘Innovating for Sustainable Growth: A 
Bioeconomy for Europe’, COM(12)60, at 4. 
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and coherence in sectoral policies.52 Particular emphasis is placed on the need to 
support the implementation of an ecosystem-based management, as well as provision 
of ecosystem services.53 The consideration for ecosystem services is reasserted also in 
the ‘Roadmap for Moving to a Competitive Low-carbon Economy in 2050’, where 
the Commission mentions enhancing the resilience of ecosystems as a potential tool 
to increase resource efficiency,54 while emphasizing also the need for improved 
agricultural and forestry practices to address the dual challenges of global food 
security and climate change.55 
 
In parallel, green growth has been promoted by the G8 and G20 as a win-win solution 
to both the climate and economic crises.56 In 2009, the G8 Leaders declared that ‘we 
must seize the opportunity to build on synergies between actions to combat climate 
change and economic recovery initiatives, and encourage growth and sustainable 
development worldwide’.57 In 2012, G20 finance ministers and central bank 
governors also requested the OECD, the World Bank and the UN to prepare a report 
that provides options for G20 countries on ‘inserting green growth and sustainable 
development policies into structural reform agendas, tailored to specific country 
conditions and level of development’.58 It has been suggested that the shift to green 
growth operated in these fora may also be viewed as a utilitarian strategy in relation to 
competitiveness concerns.59 
 
The OECD has sought to clarify the concept of green growth since 2009, when OECD 
Ministers signed a Declaration on Green Growth at a meeting held, prepared and 
chaired by the Republic of Korea.60 The Declaration was adopted ahead of the 
Copenhagen climate change conference, which was at the time expected to produce 
crucial decisions on further action to fight climate change. Accordingly, the 
Declaration builds explicit links between the green growth and action to tackle 
climate change. In particular, the Declaration underscores the need to ensure that 
‘each country pursues green growth policies, including tackling climate change, in 
accordance with existing international agreements and based on the principles of free 
trade and investment’.61 
 
Moving away from this original focus on climate change, the OECD has since 
undertaken a host of initiatives on green growth with much broader environmental 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., at 4. 
54 European Commission Communication of 8 March 2011, ‘Roadmap for Moving to a Competitive 
Low Carbon Economy in 2050’, COM(2011)112, at 6. 
55 Ibid., at 9. 
56 See L.Ø. Blaxekjær, n. 15 above, at 15. 
57 G8 Leaders Declaration 2009: Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future, found at: 
<http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/G8_Declaration_08_07_09_final,0.pdf>, 08 July 2009. 
58 <http://climate-l.iisd.org/news/g20-finance-ministers-and-chancellors-discuss-green-growth/>. 
59 See, e.g., J. Leitner, in Korean Green Growth Policy as Paradigm Shift: Implications for 
Development, Sustainability, and International Environmental Law (2012), found at: 
<http://envirocenter.yale.edu/calendar/63/108-Korean-Green-Growth-Policy-as-Paradigm-Shift-
Implications-for-Development-Sustainability-and-International-Environmental-Law>. 
60 Declaration on Green Growth Adopted at the Meeting of the Council at Ministerial Level on 25 June 
2009 (C/MIN(2009)5/ADD1/FINAL). 
61 Ibid., at 2; see also the contribution by J. Viñuales to this issue. 
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remit, underscoring its role as a means of implementation for sustainable 
development.62 In a summary report released in 2011,63 the OECD emphasized that 
green growth is not a replacement for sustainable development, but should be rather 
considered as a ‘subset’ of it,64 that it is an ‘operational policy agenda that can help 
achieve concrete, measurable progress at the interface between the economy and the 
environment’, and that it gives rise to new sources of economic growth consistent 
with resilient ecosystems.65 Within this context, green growth has been defined as 
fostering economic growth and development while ensuring that natural assets 
continue to provide the resources and environmental services on which human well-
being relies.66 
 
The OECD has provided a series of indications about the contours and substance of 
green growth as a means of implementation for sustainable development. It 
recognizes the dual role played by natural capital in both contributing to the 
production of marketable goods and directly providing valuable ecosystem services to 
individuals and society at large. The report acknowledges that, while markets are a 
powerful force for uncovering and creating value, they are influenced by payoffs 
which do not fully reflect the value of the entire asset base of the economy when it 
comes to market decisions relating to the use of natural capital. Properly valuing 
natural capital is therefore regarded as an essential part of a green growth strategy.67 
The report suggests that green growth strategies should focus on identifying major 
environmental priorities, and investigating any overlap between structural economic 
reform priorities and major constraints to green growth.68 Implementing a green 
growth strategy is expected to involve a mix of policies that mutually reinforce 
economic growth and the conservation of natural capital, such as fiscal and regulatory 
tools (like tax and competition policy), innovation policies placing a premium on the 
inventiveness needed to use natural capital more efficiently, as well as policies 
targeted at incentivizing efficient use of natural resources and making pollution more 
expensive,69 although potential risks of trade discrimination are noted.70 
 
This overview illustrates how the policy discourse on green growth has developed 
mostly in emerging and developed economies as a strategy to overcome the economic 
recession. The overview also suggests a narrow view of the environmental challenges 
to be addressed through green growth, pointing to the prominence of climate change 
                                                 
62 <http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,3746,en_2649_37465_44076170_1_1_1_37465,00.html>. 
63 OECD, Towards Green Growth (OECD, 2011), at 9. 
64 Ibid., at 11. 
65 Although the report does not address the issue in further detail, the matter of ecosystem services is 
addressed in another of the green growth reports prepared by the OECD. See OECD, Paying for 
Biodiversity: Enhancing the Cost-Effectiveness of Payments for Ecosystem Services (OECD, 2010). 
66 See OECD, n. 63 above, at 9. 
67 Ibid., at 19. 
68 Ibid., at 126. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., at 141, and Annex I, which reproduces a Communication issued by the OECD-hosted Freedom 
of Investment Roundtable. The Freedom of Investment process is an intergovernmental forum hosted 
since 2006 by the OECD Investment Committee, bringing together governments from around the world 
to exchange information and experiences on investment policies at regular roundtables with the aim to 
develop guidance for open, transparent and non-discriminatory investment policies. See 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3746,en_2649_34887_37363207_1_1_1_1,00.html>. 
To appear in 22(1) Review of European, Comparative and International 
Environmental Law (2013) 
 
concerns. This original narrow focus has, however, broadened in time, particularly in 
the policy and legal developments that occurred in the EU in relation to the idea of the 
bio-economy, and in the conceptual work undertaken by the OECD, which has 
emphasized ecosystem services. 
 
The notion of green growth elaborated in these fora seems to pay limited attention to 
social dimensions. The Asia-Pacific Programme on Green Growth includes only a 
brief reference to a ‘sustainable livelihoods rights-based approach’,71 whereas the 
Europe 2020 strategy encapsulates an inclusive social policy,72 making just a brief 
mention of human rights in the context of corporate social responsibility, and 
participatory governance in the context of the green growth pillar. 
 
FROM GREEN GROWTH TO GREEN ECONOMY 
 
There are significant overlaps between the concepts of green growth and green 
economy.73 The European Commission, for example, initially suggested that the 
green economy applied ‘in particular to developing countries’, even though the 
concept appeared largely similar to the notion of green growth adopted by the EU.74 
This section illustrates that the debate on the green economy has attempted to better 
encapsulate the visions of both developed and developing countries, as well as 
broader environmental and social considerations. 
 
UNEP, which oversees the Green Economy Initiative, has been the main international 
bureaucracy engaged with shaping the notion of green economy.75 The Initiative was 
launched with the sponsorship of the Norwegian Government in 2008,76 and almost 
immediately subsumed as one of nine UN-wide Joint Crisis Initiatives adopted in 
2009 to provide a UN response to the global financial and economic crises.77 The aim 
was to respond to challenges and imbalances that underlie the food, water, energy, 
ecosystem and climate crises, by motivating policymakers to adopt green investments 
responses, based on the premise that investing in green sectors has a better chance to 
bring about recovery and sustainable growth, while tackling acute environmental 
problems.78 UNEP’s efforts are notable for combining ideas to revive the world 
economy and saving or creating jobs, with the need to protect vulnerable groups,79 
and to broaden the range of countries’ perspectives. In 2009, the Initiative called for a 
                                                 
71 <http://www.greengrowth.org/?q=programme/capacitydevelopmentgreengrowth>. 
72 See COM (10)2020, n. 45 above, at 17-19. 
73 See UNDESA, n. 14 above, at 60. 
74 See COM (2011)363, n. 10 above, at 5, where it made reference to the economic valuation of natural 
resources, sustainable consumption and production, market-based mechanisms and greater private 
sector involvement. 
75 The Green Economy Initiative encompasses a wide range of research and capacity-building 
activities, including managing the developments of the TEEB Reports. See 
<http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/AboutGEI/WhatisGEI/tabid/29784/Default.aspx>. 
76 UNEP, ‘Towards a Green Economy’ (UNEP, October 2008), found at: 
<http://www.unep.org/pdf/towardsgreeneconomy-flyer.pdf>. 
77 UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, Global Financial and Economic Crisis. UN 
System Joint Crisis Initiatives (2009), found at: <http://www.undg.org/docs/10783/UN-System-Joint-
Crisis-Initiatives,-16-Sept-2009.pdf>. 
78 Ibid, at 25. 
79 UNEP, Global Green New Deal (UNEP, 2009), at 5. 
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‘global Green New Deal’ to address the financial crisis and its social, economic and 
environmental impacts, while simultaneously addressing global climate, food, fuel 
and water challenges.80 It made the case for directing governments’ economic 
stimulus spending towards green sectors and activities, such as energy efficient 
buildings, sustainable energy, sustainable transport, ecological infrastructure and 
sustainable agriculture. 
 
In 2011, UNEP’s initiatives culminated in the blueprint ‘Towards a Green Economy: 
Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication’,81 with the objective 
to ‘contribute to the Rio+20 process and the overall goal of addressing poverty and 
delivering a sustainable 21st century’.82 The blueprint emphasized that a green 
economy is not intended to ‘replace’ sustainable development,83 but that achieving 
sustainability rests almost entirely on ‘getting the economy right’.84 It identified 
‘enabling conditions’ for the transition to a green economy, singling out key areas of 
policy-making, such as: public investment and spending; market-based instruments, 
such as taxes and tradable permits; subsidy reforms in areas that deplete and degrade 
natural capital; reforming national regulatory frameworks to sustain environmentally 
and socially valuable activities.85 Payments for ecosystem services, reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), and environment-
related taxes were included amongst the instruments to address environmental 
externalities and market failures,86 while property laws and access rights, traditional 
command and control regulations and effective enforcement are identified as potential 
drivers for green investment.87 
 
Notably, the blueprint set out to dispel the ‘myth’ that green economy is a luxury only 
wealthy countries can afford, arguing that it can instead be a new engine for growth, 
as well as a strategy for the elimination of persistent poverty.88 The blueprint 
recommends investing 2 percent of global GDP in greening key sectors of the 
economy in order to shift development and ‘unleash public and private capital flows 
onto a low-carbon, resource-efficient path’.89 The green economy is defined as one 
that results in ‘improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly 
reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities’.90 Within this framework, 
growth in income and employment is expected to be driven by public and private 
investments that reduce carbon emissions and pollution, enhance energy and resource 
efficiency, and prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services.91 Emphasis is 
placed on a development path that rebuilds natural capital as a critical economic asset 
and source of public benefits, especially for poor people whose livelihoods and 
                                                 
80 Ibid. 
81 UNEP, Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication 
(UNEP, 2011). 
82 Ibid., at v. 
83 Ibid., at 17. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid., at 552. 
86 Ibid., at 560. 
87 Ibid., at 564. 
88 Ibid., at 16. 
89 Ibid., at 24. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
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security depend strongly on nature.92 
 
Overall, UNEP’s indications about the policy tools for the green economy are very 
similar to those discussed in the context of the discourse on green growth, although 
the approach appears more cognizant of social dimensions. Along similar lines, the 
World Bank facilitated a conceptual transition from green growth to green economy 
as ‘the pathway to sustainable development’,93 by making green growth relevant to all 
nations, including poor countries, and emphasizing its social inclusiveness dimension. 
 
In a report released in 2012, the Bank argued that green growth should aim at 
operationalizing sustainable development by reconciling developing countries’ 
‘urgent need for rapid growth and poverty alleviation’ with the need to avoid 
‘irreversible and costly environmental damage’.94 To this end, the Bank emphasizes 
social inclusiveness as a fundamental component of green growth (referring to 
‘inclusive green growth’), underscoring that political and social acceptability require 
that green growth policies be designed with the specific goals of mitigating tradeoffs 
and offsetting costs by maximizing synergies and short-term economic benefits.95 It is 
furthermore argued that innovative solutions should combine political legitimacy with 
the ability to commit to long-term objectives and to monitor progress towards them96 
through iterative, multistakeholder involvement and extensive consultation.97 Poverty 
reduction strategies, economic development plans, disaster risk reduction strategies, 
and climate strategies are seen as particularly propitious opportunities in this 
connection.98 The Bank also suggests aligning budget expenditures with 
environmental policy goals, giving proper consideration to tradeoffs, pointing also to: 
pricing and fiscal policies; taxes, subsidies or subsidy removal; natural capital, 
agriculture and ecosystem services management; and infrastructure, building, 
urbanism, transport and energy.99 On renewable resources, the Bank recommends 
focusing policy efforts on defining property rights and helping firms move up the 
value chain. For cultivated renewable resources, policy should instead focus on 
innovation, efficiency gains, sustainable intensification, and ‘integrated landscape’ 
approaches,100 to avoid regarding the elements of natural capital in isolation and 
increase production of both ‘regulating’ and ‘provisioning’ services of natural 
capital.101 
 
THE NEED FOR CONCEPTUAL CLARITY IN THE RUN-UP TO RIO+20 
 
The idea of a global understanding of green economy certainly permeated the policy 
                                                 
92 Ibid. 
93 World Bank, Inclusive Green Growth (World Bank, 2012), at xi. The report defines green growth as 
‘growth that is efficient in its use of natural resources, clean in that it minimizes pollution and 
environmental impacts, and resilient in that it accounts for natural hazards and the role of 
environmental management and natural capital in preventing physical disasters.’ Ibid., at 2. 
94 Ibid. and at 25. 
95 Ibid., at 153. 
96 Ibid., at 154. 
97 Ibid., at 155. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid., at 160. 
100 Ibid., at 105. 
101 Ibid. 
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debate in the UN General Assembly on the possibility to organize a high-level event 
on sustainable development in 2012, when Brazil suggested working towards ‘a 
comprehensive political declaration that would indicate new areas of convergence and 
consolidate the international consensus on the paradigm of green economy’, as well as 
a ‘plan of action for the achievement of the objectives set forth by the conference, 
including the implementation of the green economy paradigm’.102 The European 
Commission welcomed the focus on the green economy and, departing from its earlier 
views,103 emphasized that ‘the green economy offers opportunities to all countries, 
irrespective of their level of development and the structure of their economies’.104 
 
The qualified reference to the green economy ‘in the context of sustainable 
development and poverty eradication’ included in the UNCSD mandate105 highlights 
the concerns about the relationship between the green economy, sustainable 
development and poverty eradication. It hints at uneasiness about the green economy 
‘hijacking’ the sustainable development agenda.106 And indeed, the preparatory work 
for the conference led by the UN Secretary-General greatly focused on clarifying this 
conceptual and politically charged question. 
 
In a report prepared to support discussions ahead of the Rio+20 conference, based on 
existing literature as well as contributions of States, major groups and UN entities, the 
Secretary-General suggested that the concept of green economy is one amongst 
‘several mutually complementary constructions’ that have emerged to enhance 
convergence between the different dimensions of sustainable development, together 
with national sustainable development strategies, the Millennium Development Goals, 
integrated policy and planning, sustainable livelihoods and pro-poor approaches.107 
The report defined green economy as an ‘omnibus term’, comprising a suite of 
economic instruments that could harness economic activity in support of one or more 
sustainable development goals, including taxes, subsidies and procurement 
policies.108 Emphasizing that a green economy model could slow the development 
process,109 the Secretary-General cautioned that prescriptions on internalizing 
externalities could have adverse social impacts if they are not carefully designed and 
complemented by additional demand- and supply-side policies.110 The main concern 
emerging from the Secretary-General’s groundwork was therefore that developmental 
and social dimensions, in particular poverty eradication, were not covered adequately 
in the debate on the green economy. The report also underscored that further 
conceptual clarity was needed on the links between a green economy and sustainable 
development, particularly in as much as distributional implications, international 
cooperation and the global dimensions of international trade, investment and 
                                                 
102 As reported in UNGA Resolution A/RES/64/236, at paragraph 64 (emphases added). 
103 As highlighted above, the European Commission initially suggested that the concept of the green 
economy applies ‘in particular to developing countries’. See COM (2011)363, n. 10 above, at 5. 
104 Ibid. 
105 UNGA Resolution A/RES/64/236, n. 1 above, at paragraph 20. 
106 See also UNDESA, n. 14 above, at 61 
107 UN Secretary General, Progress to Date and Remaining Gaps in the Implementation of the 
Outcomes of the Major Summits in the Area of Sustainable Development, as well as an Analysis of the 
Themes of the Conference, Summary (UN Doc. A/CONF.216/PC/2, 1 April 2010), at paragraph 43. 
108 Ibid., at paragraphs 57 and 44. 
109 Ibid., at paragraph 45. 
110 Ibid. 
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technology transfer were concerned.111 
 
As the preparations for the UNCSD proceeded, a second report of the Secretary-
General emphasized that the concept of a green economy had gained new currency as 
‘a lens for focusing on and seizing opportunities to advance economic and 
environmental goals simultaneously’,112 underscoring that its scope is greater than 
mere low-carbon growth.113 By emphasizing ‘the context of sustainable development 
and poverty eradication’, the Secretary-General called for a bottom-up approach to 
economic decision-making that responds to national and local priorities and 
challenges.114 
 
THE RIO+20 NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Notwithstanding these important conceptual steps forward, in the run-up to the 
Rio+20 summit submissions from governments, international organizations and other 
stakeholders continued to point to a clear lack of agreement on a common definition 
for the green economy.115 Some consensus seemed to emerge, however, that a green 
economy should take the Rio Declaration116 and its principles as a fixed point of 
reference, and that it needed to be kept sufficiently broad and flexible, without turning 
into a constraining international rule or standard.117 These specifications responded to 
developing countries’ concerns that the green economy may be used to impose 
restrictions on trade or aid, justify ‘green protectionism’,118 undermine the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities,119 or 
downplay the social development pillar of sustainable development.120 In this regard, 
                                                 
111  Ibid., at paragraphs 55 and 57. 
112 Objective and Themes of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Report of the 
Secretary-General (UN Doc. A/CONF.216/PC/7, 22 December 2010) (‘Objective and Themes’), at 
paragraph 24. 
113 Ibid., at paragraph 118. As suggested, for example, in M. Huberty et al., ‘Shaping the Green Growth 
Economy’ (The Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, 2011), found at: 
<http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/Shaping-the-Green-Growth-Economy_report.pdf>, at 
6, where the notion of green growth is defined as: ‘job creation or GDP growth compatible with or 
driven by actions to reduce greenhouse gasses.’ 
114 See Objective and Themes, n. 112 above, at paragraph 117. 
115 Synthesis Report on Best Practices and Lessons Learned on the Objective and Themes of the United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Note by the Secretariat (UN Doc. 
A/CONF.216/PC/8, 21 January 2011) (‘Synthesis Report’), at 60. The preference for framing green 
economy as a ‘tool to achieve sustainable development’, rather than for providing a definition had 
already emerged in the regional preparatory meetings for Rio+20. See P. Chasek, ‘Incorporating 
Regional Priorities into Global Conferences: A Review of the Regional Preparatory Committee 
Meetings for Rio+20’, 21:1 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 
(2012), 4, at 6. 
116 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, found in Report of the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), 14 June 1992), Annex (‘Rio 
Declaration’). 
117 See Synthesis Report, n. 115 above, at 61-62. 
118 As suggested, for example, in the submissions by Botswana, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Guatemala, India, Kenya, Nepal, Pakistan, The Philippines, The Russian Federation and Venezuela. 
Found at: <http://www.uncsd2012.org/comp_memberstates.html> 
119 As suggested, for example, in the submission by Cuba; see also the discussion by J. Pauwelyn in 
this issue. 
120 As suggested, for example, in the submission by Algeria. 
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it was suggested that UNCSD needed to ensure that resources, technical assistance 
and technology transfer121 be made available to enable countries to participate 
competitively in a global green marketplace, and that green industries generate jobs 
and improve livelihoods and reduce inequality both within and between countries.122 
In addition, UN Members had divergent views on the relative emphasis accorded to 
different types of green economy policies (e.g. internalization of environmental 
externalities through prices, taxes and subsidies, and public expenditures on green 
infrastructure and technologies),123 although some agreement on core elements of a 
green economy (such as renewable energy, energy and material efficiency 
improvements and sustainable buildings, as well as on the importance of a supportive 
fiscal policy framework) appeared to emerge.124 Explicit financial commitments and 
the definition of the transitional steps both at the national and international level were 
equally considered necessary to achieve consensus.125 
 
The most ambitious proponents of the green economy called for the adoption of 
‘roadmaps’ setting specific goals, objectives and actions at the national and 
international levels to promote international coordination and policy coherence to 
support the green economy.126 Switzerland, for example, suggested that the outcome 
of UNCSD should include a shared vision guided by the Rio principles, common 
goals, indicators and a timeline for the next 20 years, as well as a toolbox with 
concrete approaches and measures based on best practices.127 The EU similarly 
prioritized the adoption of an international green economy roadmap,128 underscoring 
the role of private sector activities in promoting and adopting a sustainable business 
model, including environmental and social concerns in their investment decisions, 
coupled with a capacity development scheme for voluntary country-specific (and, 
where appropriate, region and sector-specific) actions.129 Developing countries, 
however, cautioned that the adoption of a global roadmap might not respect 
developmental and economic diversity and impose an external timeline determining 
the pace of countries’ transitions to a green economy, potentially limiting their 
economic growth.130 
 
As formal negotiations went underway, the ‘zero draft’ compiled on the basis of the 
input received from States and stakeholders, as well as comments offered during an 
intersessional meeting in December 2011, stated that a green economy in the context 
                                                 
121 See also the contribution by C. Correa to this issue. 
122 See Synthesis Report, n. 115 above, at paragraph 78, quoting the submission by ECLAC. 
123 Ibid., at paragraph 65. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid., at paragraph 79. 
126 For an overview of submissions on this specific issue, see A. Cutter, Briefing Note: Green Economy 
Roadmaps (2011), found at: 
<http://www.stakeholderforum.org/fileadmin/files/Briefing%20Note%20Green%20Economy%20Road
maps.pdf>. 
127 Compilation Document – Rio+20 - United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (2012), 
found at: <www.uncsd2012.org/compilationdocument>, at 407. 
128 Contribution by the European Union and its Member States to the UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (2011), at 3. Found at: 
<http://www.uncsd2012.org/index.php?page=view&type=510&nr=240&menu=20>  
129 Ibid., at 9. 
130 See A. Cutter, n. 126 above, at 5. On resistance against the idea of a ‘roadmap’ in the regional 
preparatory process for Rio+20, see P. Chasek, n. 115 above, at 7. 
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of sustainable development and poverty eradication should 
 
contribute to meeting key goals – in particular the priorities of poverty 
eradication, food security, sound water management, universal access to modern 
energy services, sustainable cities, management of oceans and improving 
resilience and disaster preparedness, as well as public health, human resource 
development and sustained, inclusive and equitable growth that generates 
employment, including for youth.131 
 
The zero draft also indicated that the green economy was not intended as a rigid set of 
rules, but rather as a decision-making framework to foster integrated consideration of 
the three pillars of sustainable development in all relevant domains of public and 
private decision-making.132 Roadmaps were presented as an essential step in 
measuring global progress towards the achievement of a green economy over the 
period 2012-2030.133 While portraying an environmentally broad notion of green 
economy and trying to balance the concerns of developed and developing countries, 
the text on the green economy was notably silent on economic evaluation, human 
rights and corporate accountability. Elsewhere in the zero draft, however, references 
to ecosystem services and investment in natural capital were made with specific 
regard to biodiversity,134 and to the need to explore mechanisms to compensate and 
reward mountain communities for the services they provide through ecosystem 
protection.135 Human rights were mentioned only in connection to the right to water, 
the right to food and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.136 
 
At Rio+20, delegates could not agree on a common understanding on whether the 
green economy is to be regarded as the preferable ‘means to achieve sustainable 
development’137 or just as a mere ‘decision-making framework to foster integrated 
consideration of the three pillars of sustainable development’.138 The conference 
reached the modest conclusion that ‘a’ green economy139 is ‘one of the important 
tools available for achieving sustainable development’.140 And instead of calling for 
‘a transition’ to the green economy and endorsing a roadmap for such transition, the 
outcome document simply encourages ‘each country to consider the implementation 
of green economy policies’, promising international support to those developing 
countries that wish to do so.141 The summit succeeded, however, in shifting away 
from the ‘original monocultural model’ of green growth,142 confirming a broader 
                                                 
131 See Zero Draft, n. 12 above, at paragraph 25. 
132 Ibid., at paragraph 27. 
133 Ibid., at paragraphs 40 and 43. 
134 Ibid., at paragraph 91. 
135 Ibid., at paragraph 94. 
136 Ibid., at paragraphs 67, 64 and 21. 
137 Ibid., at paragraph 26. 
138 Ibid., at paragraph 27. 
139 It is noteworthy that the article ‘the’ is never used before ‘green economy’ in the Outcome 
Document. 
140 The Future We Want, n. 2 above, at paragraph 56 (emphasis added). 
141 Ibid., at paragraph 62. 
142 P. Kohona, ‘The Future We Wanted – The Future We Will Get’, 42:3 Environmental Policy and 
Law (2012), 137, at 138.  
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environmental remit143 and emphasizing its social dimension and need for 
inclusiveness.144 
 
One thing was certainly clarified at the Rio+20 Summit: the green economy should be 
regarded as a strategy for achieving sustainable development,145 a paradigm to better 
plan and operationalize sustainable development, not a replacement of it. What 
remains to be elucidated is whether these difficult negotiations have actually 
contributed to further the international community’s understanding of how to better 
achieve sustainable development. Does the text on the green economy adopted at 
Rio+20 add anything new to the debate on more effective implementation of 
international environmental law? 
 
LEGAL DIMENSIONS 
 
To answer this question, the following sections will analyse the outcome document of 
the Rio+20 Conference related to a green economy from three inter-related legal 
perspectives: the principle of environmental integration; the principle of intra-
generational equity and related human rights questions; and international standards on 
corporate environmental accountability. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION 
 
The policy debate on the green economy held the potential to overhaul environmental 
integration, by enabling a shift from just ‘taking into account’ environmental concerns 
(without prioritizing them over short-term economic and social priorities) to placing 
environmental management at the centre of economic development. Environmental 
integration is a crucial facet of sustainable development146 and has been described as 
practical tool by which issues relevant to sustainable development can be 
synthesized.147 As opposed to a negative approach to environmental integration 
                                                 
143 See references to ‘maintaining the healthy functioning of the Earth’s ecosystems’ in The Future We 
Want, n. 2 above, at paragraph 56; to ‘sustainable resource management, resource efficiency and waste 
reduction’ in ibid., at paragraph 60; and to ‘sustainable production and consumption, and conservation 
and sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystems’ in ibid., at paragraph 61. 
144 See references to ‘enhancing social inclusion, improving human welfare and creating opportunities 
for employment and decent work for all’ in ibid., at paragraph 56; to ‘[p]romote sustained and inclusive 
economic growth, foster innovation and provide opportunities, benefits and empowerment for all and 
respect of all human rights’ in ibid., at paragraph 58(d); to enhancing ‘the welfare of indigenous 
peoples and their communities, other local and traditional communities and ethnic minorities, 
recognizing and supporting their identity, culture and interests, and avoid endangering their cultural 
heritage, practices and traditional knowledge, preserving and respecting non-market approaches that 
contribute to the eradication of poverty’, in ibid., at paragraph 58 (j); and to ‘the welfare of women, 
children, youth, persons with disabilities, smallholder and subsistence farmers, fisherfolk and those 
working in small and medium-sized enterprises, and improve the livelihoods and empowerment of the 
poor and vulnerable groups in particular in developing countries’ in ibid., at paragraph 58(k). 
145 C. Spence and A. Vavilov, ‘Summary of the UNCSD Informal Consultations and Third 
Intersessional Meeting: 17-19 May 2010’, 27:1 Earth Negotiation Bulletin (2010), at 8. 
146 A. Boyle and D. Freestone, ‘Introduction’, in: A. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds.), International Law 
and Sustainable Development (Oxford University Press, 1999), at 4; see also C. Voigt, Sustainable 
Development as a Principle of International Law: Resolving Conflicts Between Climate Measures and 
WTO Law (Brill, 2009), at 36. 
147 International Law Association, Committee on International Law on Sustainable Development, 
Seventy-Forth Report (2004), at 13; S. Jodoin, The Principle of Integration and Interrelationship in 
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focused on preventing and mitigating environmental damage arising from economic 
development,148 the green economy bore the promise of a positive approach whereby 
environmental protection measures would be actively favoured to achieve economic 
development. Whether Rio+20 contributed to materializing this potential can only be 
ascertained in a historical perspective, considering previous international normative 
developments on environmental integration. 
 
Environmental integration was addressed in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, which 
called for an integrated approach to development planning so as to ensure that 
development is ‘compatible’ with the need to protect and improve the environment 
for the benefit of the population.149 The 1992 Rio Declaration cemented this concept, 
stating that environmental protection shall constitute an ‘integral part’ of the 
development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it.150 Chapter eight of 
Agenda 21 already pointed to the usefulness of economic instruments and market 
(and other) incentives for integrating environment and development in decision-
making and establishing systems for integrated environmental and economic 
accounting.151 The 2002 Johannesburg Declaration underscored a collective 
responsibility to ensure that environmental regulations are seen as ‘interdependent 
and mutually reinforcing pillars’ of sustainable development, together with economic 
and social development.152 
 
Against this background, the debate on the green economy at UNCSD was an 
opportunity for the international community to reflect progress in the understanding 
of the effectiveness of market-based and economic instruments for environmental 
management – an approach that was already contemplated in Agenda 21. The concept 
of ecosystem services153 could have been useful to highlight that the most promising 
path, not only for effective international cooperation but also for business 
development and job creation at national and local levels, is to systematically seize 
the new investment opportunities and economic savings that result from the 
innovative environmental management approaches. The notion of ecosystem services 
highlights the connection between environmental protection, human well-being and 
poverty eradication, as well as the need to carry out an economic valuation of 
ecosystems and of their protection (or of the costs of lack of protection).154 
 
                                                                                                                                           
Relation to Human Rights and Social, Economic and Environmental Objectives (Centre for 
International Sustainable Development Law, 2005), at 13. 
148 V. Barral, ‘Sustainable Development in International Law: Nature and Operation of an Evolutive 
Legal Norm’, 23:2 European Journal of International Law (2012), 337 at 337; based on Award in the 
Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine Railway between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands, 27 RIAA (2005), 35, at paragraph 59. 
149 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, found in Report of the UN Conference on the 
Human Environment (UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, 16 June 1972), Principle 13. 
150 Rio Declaration, n. 116 above, Principle 4. 
151 Agenda 21, found in Report of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UN Doc. 
A/Conf.151/26, 14 June 1992), Chapter 8. 
152 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, found in Report of the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20 26 August- 4 September 2002). 
153 See A. Steiner, n. 11 above, at 9. Instead, references to ecosystem services can be found in other 
parts of the Future We Want, n. 2 above, at paragraphs 177; 193; 197 and 201. 
154 E. Morgera, ‘The 2005 UN World Summit and the Environment: The Proverbial Half-Full Glass’, 
15 Italian Yearbook of International Law (2006) 53. 
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The 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment155 was the first global study garnering 
international consensus on the term ecosystem services as the benefits people obtain 
from ecosystems, including provisioning services such as food, water, timber, and 
fibre; regulating services that affect climate, floods, diseases, wastes, and water 
quality; cultural services that provide recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; 
and supporting services such as soil formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling. 
This understanding has been more recently complemented by global economic 
valuation studies that show why prosperity depends on maintaining the flow of 
benefits from ecosystems and why successful environmental protection needs to be 
grounded in sound economics, including explicit recognition, efficient allocation, and 
fair distribution of the costs and benefits of conservation and sustainable use of 
natural resources. As pointed out at the outset, this approach has particularly 
influenced the CBD156 but not (yet) other multilateral environmental processes. 
 
The Rio+20 outcome document reflects this status quo: ecosystem services appear 
nowhere in the agreed text on the green economy, and the term is only used with 
reference to biological diversity.157 Equally, the use of economic valuation to ensure 
better environmental regulation is only mentioned in connection with biodiversity: 
 
We support mainstreaming the consideration of the socioeconomic impacts 
and benefits of the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and its 
components, as well as ecosystems that provide essential services, into 
relevant programmes and policies at all levels, in accordance with national 
legislation, circumstances and priorities. We encourage investments, through 
appropriate incentives and policies, which support the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity and restoration of degraded 
ecosystems, consistent and in harmony with the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and other relevant international obligations.158 
 
Another useful input from Rio+20 could have been a focus on the green economy as 
an opportunity to ensure mutual supportiveness159 among disparate sectoral 
environmental efforts.160 The ‘internal’ dimension of environmental integration 
foresees that environmental law itself is to be construed and interpreted broadly, 
taking into consideration all global environmental objectives – in essence requiring a 
holistic approach to global environmental law-making.161 Challenges to the internal 
                                                 
155 The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Synthesis (2005), 
found at: <www.maweb.org/en/index.aspx>. Note that the notion had already been discussed in the 
natural science literature, e.g. P.R. Ehrlich and H.A. Mooney, ‘Extinction, Substitution, and Ecosystem 
Services’, 33:4 BioScience (1983), 248. 
156 See TEEB, n. 6 above, at 6; see also E. Morgera and E. Tsioumani, n 7 above. 
157 The Future We Want, n. 2 above, at paragraphs 177, 197, 201 and 204. 
158 Ibid., at paragraph 201. 
159 R. Pavoni, ‘Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making: A Watershed 
for the WTO-and-Competing-Regimes Debate?’, 21:3 European Journal of International Law (2010), 
649, at 662. 
160 The potential link between green economy and the fragmentation of global environmental 
governance is discussed by J. Gupta and N. Sanchez, ‘Global Green Governance: Embedding the 
Green Economy in a Global Green and Equitable Rule of Law Polity’, 21:1 Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law (2012), 12. 
161 This dimension has been mostly explored in EU Environmental Law: see N. Dhondt, Integration of 
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dimension of environmental integration are becoming apparent as climate change 
assumes an increasingly prominent position in global development and security 
agendas.162 Possible negative impacts of climate change response measures on other 
areas of environmental protection and cooperation are particularly evident with regard 
to biodiversity.163 Although the debate on the green economy has stressed the need to 
address in a mutually supportive manner the climate, biodiversity loss and energy 
crises,164 the increased need for global attention to the internal dimension of 
environmental integration was not adequately emphasized in the Rio+20 outcome 
document. While the zero draft at least mentioned ‘multiple interrelated crises’ of 
financial, economic, energy, food, climate change and biodiversity loss,165 this 
language was not retained in the final document. 
 
INTRA-GENERATIONAL EQUITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
In addition to environmental integration, intra-generational equity is another essential 
dimension of sustainable development,166 representing a concrete objective towards 
which States are expected to take identifiable steps.167 While the intergovernmental 
negotiations preceding the Rio+20 conference highlighted concerns related to equity 
and fairness among States, comparatively little debate took place on how the green 
economy might negatively impact equitable relations between governments and their 
communities. In particular, it had been observed that few States addressed the 
question of whether a green economy focusing on business opportunities and cost-
effectiveness in environmental protection would adequately factor in interlinkages 
with human well-being168 and community livelihoods,169 and whether it could lead to 
                                                                                                                                           
Environmental Protection into Other EC Policies (Europa Law Publishing, 2003), at 179; and E. 
Morgera, ‘Ambition, Complexity and Legitimacy of Pursuing Mutual Supportiveness through the EU’s 
External Environmental Action’, in: B. Van Vooren, S. Blockmans and J. Wouters (eds.), The EU’s 
Role in Global Governance: The Legal Dimension (Oxford University Press, 2013, forthcoming). 
162 In the EU context this is well exemplified by the specific mention of climate change in Article 191.1 
of the Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, [2008] OJ 
C115/49, which reads: ‘Union policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the following 
objectives: … promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide 
environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change’ (emphasis added). For an earlier 
discussion of the political priority attached to climate change by the EU, see E. Morgera and G. Marín 
Durán, ‘The UN 2005 World Summit, the Environment and the EU: Priorities, Promises and 
Prospects’, 15:1 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (2006), 1. 
163 The parties to the CBD have increasingly addressed the environmental sustainability of response 
measures to climate change. See E. Morgera, ‘Far Away, So Close: A Legal Analysis of the Increasing 
Interactions between the Convention on Biological Diversity and Climate Change Law’, 2:1 Climate 
Law (2011), 85; and Secretariat of the CBD, Connecting Biodiversity and Climate Change Mitigation 
and Adaptation: Report of the Second Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Biodiversity and Climate 
Change, Technical Series, No. 41 (Secretariat of the CBD, 2009). 
164 See A. Steiner, n. 11 above, at 5 and 12. 
165 See Zero Draft, n. 12 above, at 11. 
166 P. Sands et al., Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
at 206-217. 
167 See V. Barral, n. 148 above. 
168 See, e.g., R. Costanza et al., Building a Sustainable and Desirable Economy in Society in Nature 
(United Nations Division for Sustainable Development, 2012). 
169 K. Bosselmann, P.G. Brown and B. Mackey, Enabling a Flourishing Earth: Challenges for the 
Green Economy, Opportunities for Global Governance’, 21:1 Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law (2012), 23. 
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the further marginalization of indigenous peoples and local communities that 
contribute to environmental conservation and management in ways that are difficult to 
capture in purely economic terms.170 As noted above, the UN Secretary-General also 
highlighted that these dimensions of the green economy had only sporadically 
emerged in the policy debate on this concept. These considerations were thus not 
reflected in the zero draft. In the lead-up to the Rio+20 conference, however, human 
rights advocates drew attention to the need for procedural guarantees at the 
international and national levels for new global environmental and sustainable 
development goals.171 Indigenous peoples’ representatives highlighted concerns about 
the lack of attention to substantive rights of access to natural resources and to the 
protection of traditional knowledge.172 
 
In this regard, Rio+20 could have established a clearer link between the green 
economy and ecosystem services, human wellbeing173 and the ecosystem approach. 
The latter in particular could have provided a lens to identify both procedural and 
substantive human rights concerns. The ecosystem approach has been defined as the 
integrated, iterative, adaptive and precautionary174 approach to environmental 
management that is based on broad stakeholder engagement and consideration of the 
impacts of environmental degradation and management options on the most 
vulnerable sectors of society.175 A key element that has emerged in the context of the 
ecosystem approach is the sharing of benefits arising from the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological resources and from access to genetic resources.176 
 
According to the benefit-sharing approach, governments are expected to involve 
indigenous peoples and local communities in decision-making and good faith 
negotiations. Furthermore, they are also to reward communities for sharing their 
traditional knowledge in planning and environmental management, or compensate 
them for the negative impacts of conservation or sustainable management activities on 
                                                 
170 D. Shelton, ‘Commentary on Achim Steiner's 2009 Grotius Lecture’, 25:5 American University 
International Law Review (2010), 877. As noted above, some references to these issues surfaced in the 
negotiations on other portions of the outcome document, namely mountains. 
171 Open Letter from Special Procedures Mandate-holders of the Human Rights Council to States 
Negotiating the Outcome Document of the Rio+20 Summit, found at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/OpenLetterRio20.aspx>. 
172 ‘Indigenous Peoples Insist on Rights-based Approaches and Respect for Traditional Knowledge and 
Practices in Rio+20 Outcomes’ (20 June 2012), found at: 
<http://www.uncsd2012.org/index.php?page=view&nr=1259&type=230&menu=38>. 
173 A. Steiner, n. 11 above, at 9, stresses a ‘fundamental link between ecosystem services and human 
rights’, while P. Doran, ‘Care of the Self, Care of the Earth: A New Conversation for Rio+20?’, 21:1 
Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (2012), 31, at 42, suggests that 
human wellbeing ‘is the collateral damage’ of the green economy. 
174 A. Trouwborst, ‘The Precautionary Principle and the Ecosystem Approach in International Law: 
Differences, Similarities and Linkages’, 18:1 Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law (2009), 26. 
175 CBD Decision V/6, Principles of the Ecosystem Approach (UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23, 22 
June 2000); and Decision VII/11 Refinement and Elaboration of the Ecosystem Approach, Based on 
Assessment of Experience of Parties in Implementation (UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/11, 13 
April 2004). 
176 This argument is fully developed, on the basis of a series of decisions of the CBD Conference of the 
Parties, in E. Morgera and E. Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of Benefit-sharing: Linking Biodiversity and 
Community Livelihoods’, 19:2 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 
(2010), 150. 
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their natural resources or cultural practices. Governments are therefore expected to 
provide communities with a direct stake in protecting the environment, a legal market 
with moderate prices for sustainable natural resource use and an economic or other 
incentive to prevent degradation. Significantly, benefits can be of a monetary and 
non-monetary nature. In many instances communities may be more interested in the 
latter, particularly where the benefits involve legal recognition of traditional rights to 
access to certain resources or protection of customary sustainable use practices. 
Benefits may also refer to the provision of guidance (such as training or capacity-
building) to improve the environmental sustainability of community practices, and the 
proactive identification of opportunities for better/alternative livelihoods in these 
endeavours, with a view to facilitating understanding of, and compliance with, the 
law.177 They may also include opportunities for indigenous peoples and local 
communities to participate in private investments, and indeed international guidance 
on benefit-sharing has been drafted and applied directly also to the private sector.178 
 
A conceptualization of the green economy that placed development within an 
ecosystem-based framework would call upon the State (and the private sector, in the 
absence of, or in addition to, relevant State action) to adopt a bottom-up approach to 
building a true partnership with communities for the conservation and sustainable use 
of the environment by proactively providing a combination of economic and non-
economic benefits. This would enable the proper valuation and rewarding of the 
environmental stewardship of indigenous peoples and local communities.179 While 
ecosystem services or the ecosystem approach were not resorted to, the final text on 
the green economy does contain important references to human rights and community 
livelihoods. 
 
First of all, the outcome document recognizes that green economy policies should 
‘provide opportunities, benefits and empowerment for all and respect of all human 
rights’.180 In addition, it asserts that green economy policies should 
 
enhance the welfare of indigenous peoples and their communities, other local 
and traditional communities and ethnic minorities, recognizing and supporting 
their identity, culture and interests, and avoid endangering their cultural 
heritage, practices and traditional knowledge, preserving and respecting non-
market approaches that contribute to the eradication on poverty.181 
 
Finally, green economy policies should 
 
enhance the welfare of … smallholder and subsistence farmers, fisherfolk and 
those working in small and medium-sized enterprises, and improve the 
livelihoods and empowerment of the poor and vulnerable groups in particular in 
                                                 
177 Ibid. 
178 E. Morgera, ‘From Corporate Social Responsibility to Accountability Mechanisms’, in: P.M Dupuy 
and J. Viñuales (eds.), Protecting the Environment in the XXIst Century – The Role of the Private 
Sector (Cambridge University Press, 2013, forthcoming). 
179 This argument was initially put forward in E. Morgera, ‘Rio+20: Charting the Way to a Green 
Economy’, 3:3 Solutions (2012), found at: < http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/1100>. 
180 The Future We Want, n. 2 above, at paragraph 58(d). 
181 Ibid., at paragraph 58(j). 
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developing countries.182 
 
Overall, Rio+20 seized the opportunity to strengthen the social dimension of the 
green economy, and also firmly encapsulated a human rights-based approach in it. 
This is probably the most important advance compared with previous summits.183 
 
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
One could have expected the discussion on a green economy to concentrate on, or at 
least be the natural conceptual framework for, taking stock of international normative 
developments on corporate environmental accountability. The 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development had indeed placed emphasis on ‘corporate 
accountability’184 as the legitimate expectation that reasonable efforts be put in place, 
according to international environmental standards, by private companies.185 And 
since then the international community has made significant progress in accepting that 
business entities have certain ‘responsibilities’ vis-à-vis international law, notably in 
relation to human rights186 and environmental sustainability.187 In particular, a 
continued and increasingly marked convergence has characterized disparate 
international standard-setting and monitoring activities, leading to a clear set of 
minimum expectations about environmentally sustainable business conduct that 
respects human rights.188 It is therefore quite striking and unfortunate that the Rio+20 
outcome not only does not attempt to follow up on the agreed language on corporate 
accountability in Johannesburg, but does not even reflect or make reference to 
relevant international developments on corporate environmental accountability that 
have occurred since then. Norway and the EU attempted to include specific references 
to international corporate accountability guidelines, notably the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
and the UN Global Compact,189 but without success. 
 
                                                 
182 Ibid. 
183 D. Shelton, ‘What Happened in Rio to Human Rights?’, 3 Yearbook of International Environmental 
Law (1992), 75. 
184 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, found in Report of the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (UN. Doc. A/CONF.199/20, 4 September 2002), 
Resolution 2, Annex, at paragraph 49. 
185 E. Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 21-24. 
186 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Protect, Respect and Remedy: A 
Framework for Business and Human Rights (UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008); Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights to implement the UN Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework (UN 
Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011). 
187 OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD, 2011); IFC Performance 
Standards (IFC, 2012), found at: <http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/policyreview.nsf/Content/2012-
Edition#PerformanceStandards>; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People (UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, 11 August 2008) (‘2008 
Report of the Special Rapporteur’). 
188 On the continued convergence of international standards on corporate environmental accountability, 
see E. Morgera n. 178 above. 
189 A. Schulz et al. ‘Summary of the Third Round of UNCSD Informal Informal Consultations: 29 May 
- 2 June 2012’, 27:40 Earth Negotiation Bulletin (2012), at 6-7. 
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An invitation to business to ‘act in accordance with the UN Global Compact’190 
would have at least highlighted how the Compact evidences that a vast number of 
private companies share the understanding that key international environmental and 
other principles are directly relevant for their operations. Instead the Rio+20 outcome 
document merely ‘invite[s] business and industry as appropriate and in accordance 
with national legislation to contribute to sustainable development and to develop 
sustainability strategies that integrate, inter alia, green economy policies’.191 
Elsewhere, the outcome document uses more forceful language in specific relation to 
mining, by ‘recogniz[ing] the importance of strong and effective legal and regulatory 
frameworks, policies and practices for the mining sector that … include effective 
safeguards that reduce social and environmental impacts, as well as conserve 
biodiversity and ecosystems, including during post-mining closure’ and by ‘call[ing] 
on governments and business to promote the continuous improvement of 
accountability and transparency’.192 
 
Significantly, Rio+20 missed the opportunity to tightly link the UN Framework on 
Business and Human Rights with relevant global environmental standards – a critical 
gap that at the moment only the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples is trying to fill.193 The conference therefore was not able to respond to 
criticisms of the green economy as an effort to ‘neuter critiques of global capitalism 
and corporate control’.194 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The evolution of the academic and policy debate on the green economy provides a 
useful background to better understand the difficulties of the Rio+20 negotiations, 
even if the distinction between green growth and green economy may have become of 
little relevance.195 The policy discourses on these two concepts have greatly 
overlapped, strongly focusing on the intersection between the environment and the 
                                                 
190 Draft of the Rio+20 Outcome Document (2 June 2012), at paragraph 63 (bracketed language), on 
file with authors.. For the full text of the Global Compact, see 
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OECD, the World Bank, UNEP, and the GGGI’s Green Growth Knowledge Platform, launched in 
February 2012, is an international knowledge‐sharing platform that brings together international 
organizations supporting and promoting both green growth and green economy: 
<http://www.greengrowthknowledge.org/Pages/GGKPHome.aspx>.  
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economy, with increasing emphasis also on social dimensions.196 
 
Throughout the Rio+20 process the debate on the green economy seemed to crucially 
revolve around whether all countries should undertake to restructure their economies 
to better accommodate environmental objectives, or whether only countries at an 
advanced level of economic development should be required to do so. Overall, the 
green economy has failed to turn into a ground for widespread consensus. The summit 
succeeded, however, in framing a multifaceted vision of green economy policies that 
takes into account different circumstances, priorities and understandings of various 
countries at different stages of development. It also confirmed that green economy 
policies are but one option to pursue sustainable development. 
 
The legal implications of the new ‘magic word’197 green economy and its suitability 
to concretely contribute to the implementation of sustainable development remain 
difficult to ascertain.198 Rio+20 was significant in embedding in the green economy 
the need to take into account human rights and the specific contributions of 
indigenous peoples and local communities to environmental management as a 
strategy towards achieving sustainable development. The conference did not, 
however, say anything new on the role of economic valuation and ecosystem services 
for environmental mainstreaming in other policy areas or in ensuring mutual 
supportiveness among disparate, sectoral environmental efforts. Neither did it take 
stock of advances by the international community on corporate accountability. 
 
Even if the Rio+20 conference did not endorse a transition to the green economy and 
did not include a roadmap to that end, the green economy will remain a key theme at 
least in some multilateral environmental negotiations. While parties to the UNFCCC 
could not agree upon referencing to the Rio+20 outcome document at their last 
meeting,199 UNEP and the EU continue to invoke the green economy concept under 
the CBD200 to bring forward economic valuation as a tool for more effective 
environmental integration, treaty implementation and involvement of the private 
sector. Perhaps progress in the understanding of the role of the green economy for 
accelerating and measuring progress towards sustainable development, including 
through the creation of the right incentives and the catalyzing of funding to achieve it, 
will become apparent in that context. 
                                                 
196 See UNDESA, n. 14 above, at 60. Although the same report notes that the two terms still appear to 
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